Credit expansion has been associated with faster economic growth and with a higher occurrence of …nancial crises, a pair of results which seem to contradict each other. This paper advances an explanation for these results by separating credit to the private sector into credit to …rms and credit to households. The empirical analysis shows that credit to …rms is responsible for the positive growth e¤ect, while the higher occurrence of crises is mainly due to credit to households. The events of the last decade, where fast credit expansion led to crises and very little growth, can be understood as a shift in the composition of credit towards its household component.
Introduction
Two large and in ‡uential literatures exploring the interactions between the …nancial system and the real economy are in substantial contradiction with each other. First, the voluminous …nance and growth literature has long argued that credit to the private sector is conducive to faster economic growth. 1 Second, the literature on the determinants of …nancial crises has Economics, Adam Smith Business School, University of Glasgow. Glasgow G12 8QQ, United Kingdom. Tel: +44 141 330 8517. Email: luis.angeles@glasgow.ac.uk 1 Important papers in this literature include King and Levine (1993) , Beck et al. (2000) , Levine et al. (2000) , Benhabib and Spiegel (2000) , Rioja and Valev (2004) , Aghion et al. (2005) and Badunenko and Romero-Avila (2013). shown that credit to the private sector, usually its growth rate but also its level, is one of the most reliable predictors of …nancial mayhem. 2 The profession is thus left with the result that high levels of credit facilitate growth but rapid increases in credit bring about growth-sapping crises.
The dissonance between these two sets of results has been noted before, but few have addressed it. Two notable exceptions are Loayza and Ranciere (2006) and Ranciere et al. (2006) . These papers study the possibility that credit to the private sector may have multiple e¤ects, and set about estimating them by using a Pooled Mean Group estimator that distinguishes between short-term and long-term e¤ects (Loayza and Ranciere 2006) or by considering a two-equation system where credit can a¤ect two macroeconomic variables simultaneously ). The present paper also advances an explanation for the apparent contradiction between the two literatures mentioned, but follows a completely di¤erent approach from Loayza and Ranciere (2006) and Ranciere et al. (2006) .
At the core of the analysis lies the simple fact that credit to the private sector is actually the sum of two rather distinct elements: credit to non…nancial …rms and credit to households. These two types of economic agents di¤er in their objectives, constraints, and behaviour. Unsurprisingly, they also di¤er in the way they use credit and thus in the e¤ects that the credit allocated to them has on economic growth and the occurrence of crises.
Non-…nancial …rms (henceforth …rms) use credit to …nance the acquisition of inputs and the expansion of their capital stock, activities which are closely linked to the growth process. Households, on the other hand, are not engaged in production and use credit mainly as a tool for consumptionsmoothing. Lending to households may be socially desirable for a number of reasons, but having an e¤ect on economic growth is not one of them. 3 2 For recent evidence, with an emphasis on the 2008 global …nancial crisis, see Schularick and Taylor (2012) and Jorda et al. (2011) . For earlier evidence, with an emphasis on crises in developing countries, see Kaminsky and Reinhart (1999) , Demirgüç-Kunt and Detragiache (1998, 2002) and Domac and Peria (2003) . 3 The main exception to this is student loans, which are used to accumulate human Equally important, household and …rm credit may have di¤erent e¤ects on the occurrence of crises. Arguably, very rapid credit growth may characterize periods when borrowers' optimism turns into speculative frenzy.
Following Kindleberger (1978) , such episodes have a tendency to end in …nancial crises as asset prices are led into irrational territory before crashing down. While …nancial speculation may be fed by all kinds of credit, the above description seems specially relevant for the largest component of household credit -namely mortgages. Indeed, mortgages …nance the acquisition of an asset whose supply is slow to react to changes in the market and whose demand is almost entirely determined by credit conditions -an ideal environment for self-ful…lling price buildups.
To summarize, credit to …rms should be behind the overall association between credit and growth while excessive credit to households would be a natural explanation for the tendency of credit expansions to be followed by crises. With this in mind, I revisit the main results of the …nance and growth literature and the literature on the determinants of …nancial crises but substitute measures of credit to the private sector with measures of credit to …rms and households.
Data and descriptive statistics
My source for credit data is the 'Long series on credit to the private non…nancial sector', …rst published by the Bank for International Settlements in April 2013. 4 The dataset disaggregates credit to the private sector into credit to …rms and credit to households using a common methodology for a large set of countries. Another advantage is the coverage of di¤erent sources of credit: not just bank credit but also credit from non-bank …nancial intermediaries and credit obtained through the bond and short-term paper markets. For the average country in our sample, 30% of total credit was capital and could therefore be expected to have a positive e¤ect on growth. Student loans are relatively unimportant in most countries other than the United States -and even there they accounted for just 8% of total household credit in 2011. 4 See Dembiermont et al. (2013) for a description of the data.
not bank credit in the year 2011. I use three series from this dataset: total credit (from all sources) allocated to the private sector, total credit allocated to …rms, and total credit allocated to households. The sum of the last two series equals the …rst one. The data is available quarterly, I average it into annual values and normalize it by each country's nominal GDP in the year in question.
The BIS data o¤ers a good coverage of countries with elaborate …nancial systems. Credit to the private sector is available for 39 countries while the data on credit to …rms and credit to households covers 34 countries. In both cases all developed economies in Western Europe, North America and the Asia-Paci…c region, plus most major emerging economies, are included.
On the other hand, the time coverage is very uneven. Time series begin in di¤erent years for di¤erent countries, and the series of total credit to the private sector often begin much earlier than those of credit to …rms and households. This results in about 70% more observations for the former as compared to the latter two. 5
A couple of points are worthy of notice. First, household credit and …rm credit are of the same order of magnitude in most countries. In 2010, the average ratio of household credit to …rm credit for the countries in our sample was 0.80. Second, and this will be of relevance later on, household credit has had a tendency to grow faster than …rm credit and this tendency markedly accelerated over the …rst decade of this century. This is illustrated in …gure 1, where the ratio of household credit to …rm credit averaged over three di¤erent groups of countries is plotted over time. 6 While di¤erences in levels are apparent across these three groups, their evolution over time is remarkably similar. In all four cases we see a slowly increasing ratio of household credit to …rm credit up to the year 2000, followed by a much steeper rise over the …rst few years of the 21st century.
[ Figure 1 here] 3 Empirical analysis 3.1 Finance and growth I follow the literature and use panel data analysis with 5-year growth intervals as pioneered by Levine et al. (2000) and Beck et al. (2000) . The empirical speci…cation is then:
where g it is the annual growth rate of GDP per capita in country i during growth interval t, F it is either total credit to the private sector or, in the present case, total credit to households and total credit to …rms (in all cases normalized by GDP), and X it is a set of control variables taken from the literature. 7 Equation (1) also includes country-speci…c …xed e¤ects and a full set of time dummies.
As is standard in the literature, I estimate (1) using the system GMM methodology of Arellano and Bover (1995) and Blundell and Bond (1998) , taking as endogenous the credit measures and all controls. Results are presented in table 1.
[ Table 1 here]
The …rst column of table 1 reproduces the standard result of the …nance and growth literature using the BIS data. Total credit to the private sector has a positive e¤ect on growth which is statistically signi…cant at the 1% level. The coe¢ cient of private credit takes a value of 0:9, which is somewhat smaller but not too removed from the values of 1:4 1:5 obtained by Beck 7 I control for the initial level of GDP per capita, average years of schooling in the adult population, government consumption over GDP, exports plus imports over GDP, and the in ‡ation rate. With the exception of GDP per capita and average years of schooling, all variables are averaged over the …ve years of each growth period. All regressors are used in log form. et al. (2000) and Levine et al. (2000) using the same methodology but di¤erent time and country coverage and a more restricted measure of credit.
The second column of table 1 reruns the standard regression but restricts the time coverage to the …rst decade of the 21st century. As previously documented by Rousseau and Wachtel (2011) using a more restricted measure of credit, the positive growth e¤ect disappears over this period: the estimated coe¢ cient is negative and not statistically signi…cant. This instability in the result brings doubts over the …nance and growth nexus.
Column 3 incorporates our measures of credit to households and credit to …rms. Results now tell a di¤erent story as credit is not universally growthenhancing. Instead, we …nd a positive growth e¤ect from credit to …rms but a negative growth e¤ect from credit to households. Both results are statistically signi…cant although the coe¢ cient on credit to …rms is estimated with more accuracy. Furthermore, this result continues to hold in column 4, when we restrict our sample to the period 2000-2010. Even though this last regression contains just 65 observations, coe¢ cients remain statistically signi…cant at the 10% level and do not change much in magnitude. The stability of the result to this change in sample coverage is reassuring, and suggests a straightforward explanation for the disappearance of the positive growth e¤ect of private credit over the last 10 years: as documented above, during this period most credit to the private sector was being directed to households. 8
Determinants of …nancial crises
Again, I follow the literature and use logistic regressions to analyse the determinants of …nancial crises. The empirical speci…cation is therefore:
8 Table 1 also reports the Arellano-Bond test for serial correlation of order two in the error term in di¤erences for columns 1 and 3 (the test is not possible in columns 2 and 4 as these use only two time periods). In both instances the test does not reject the null of no serial correlation. I do not report the Hansen test of overidentifying restrictions as the large number of instruments renders it very weak. where crisis i;t is a binary variable taking a value of 1 if a systemic …nancial crisis begins on year t in country i (and a value of 0 otherwise), is the logistic function, a vector of parameters to be estimated and X i;t a set of determinants of …nancial crises. Other than the level and growth rate of private credit, X i;t includes the level of GDP per capita, its growth rate, the in ‡ation rate, and the ratio of M2 to international reserves (all lagged by one year) as additional determinants. Equation (2) is estimated using yearly data.
Our dating of systemic …nancial crises comes from Laeven and Valencia (2008) , which is probably the most accepted source in the literature, extended for the years 2008-2010 using Reinhart and Rogo¤ (2011) . The addition of these last three years is crucial as they incorporate the Global Financial Crisis of 2008. Table A2 in 1998, 2002) and Domac and Peria (2003) . It seems that the incorporation of the Global Financial Crisis, which a¤ected almost exclusively developed nations, tends to shift the predictive power from the growth rate to the level of private credit.
[ Table 2 here] Column 3 substitutes credit to the private sector by credit to …rms and households over the period 1960-2010. The level of household credit has a positive and statistically signi…cant association with …nancial crises, and the magnitude of its coe¢ cient is three times the one obtained for private credit in column 1. Firm credit has also a positive association with …nancial crises but the coe¢ cient is much smaller and statistically signi…cant only at the 10% level. For both household and …rm credit, it is the level and not the growth rate of the variable that helps predict crises.
When I re-estimate these last results removing the last …ve years of data I …nd no major di¤erences when it comes to household credit (column 4). The coe¢ cient on the level of household credit increases slightly and remains statistically signi…cant at the 1% level. The growth rate of household credit remains not statistically signi…cant. The results for …rm credit change somewhat more, as statistical signi…cance is lost for the level of this variable but characterizes its growth rate. While the change in the results for …rm credit mimic those for overall credit to the private sector, it is reassuring to …nd a clear and unchanging relationship between household credit and the occurrence of crises. Finally, I note that I also tried estimating the e¤ect of credit growth over the last 3 and 5 years instead of the last year, and obtained very similar results.
Putting the above results together, we observe that the apparent contradiction between the …nance and growth literature and the literature on the determinants of …nancial crises may be satisfactorily explained. Once credit is disaggregated into its two main components, …rm credit appears to be behind the positive growth e¤ect while household credit is the main factor behind the enhanced occurrence of crises.
To drive the point home, I return to the estimates of table 1 but control for the occurrence of …nancial crises. If the negative e¤ect of household credit on growth is the result of a higher occurrence of crises, we should see its coe¢ cient move towards zero once crises are controlled for. In table 3, crises are controlled either by introducing a dummy variable taking a value of 1 if a crisis takes place within the 5-year interval in question (column 2) or by using the share of each 5-year interval for which a crisis was ongoing (column 3). Column 1 reproduces the results when crises are not controlled for.
As expected, the two variables controlling for the e¤ects of crises have coe¢ cients which are negative and statistically signi…cant at the 1% level.
More important, when these are introduced the coe¢ cient on household credit falls in magnitude in columns 2 and 3 and loses statistical signi…cance in column 3, which uses the more accurate measure of crises. I conclude that household credit is not damaging to growth as long as it is not allowed to degenerate into a …nancial crisis.
[ Table 3 Arellano-Bond test for AR (2) 0.098 --0.438 --Note: Standard errors in parenthesis. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. All variables are measured in logs. GDP per capita and average years of schooling are measured at the first year of each growth period. Credit to GDP, government spending, trade and inflation are averaged over all years of each growth period. 
